Thursday, July 17, 2014

The Life Kenotic


“The boy who lived, come to die.” – Lord Voldemort.[1]
As the Harry Potter saga concludes Voldemort’s quest for power, dominating and destructive power, is once again over/underwhelmed by love. In the beginning, Lily’s love for her son, through her sacrificial death, offered protection for Harry. Similarly, as Harry comes of age he is faced with the choice his mother confronted – to fight or to die for the ones he loves. It is a choice that reaches its crux in the above statement. It is a haunting quote, a haunting thought; but might this be an image from which a kenotic politic can emerge? If life brings death, can death bring life? Would such a politic bring not only spiritual life, but also real physical life, an ordered life, a life to the full? What might an ordered life look like if wedded to kenosis? Thinking broadly of politics as the ordering of human relationships, and kenosis as emptying and self-giving, I will put forward a depiction of a fluid politic of perpetual kenosis.
            The absurdity of a project of this nature should be immediately apparent. Attempting to “build” a politic on the premise of emptying seems oxymoronic. Yet, if we are committed to starting with Jesus of Nazareth, his life, death, and resurrection, and to the interpretation of his life set out by the apostles, then it is a work of imagination worthy of our efforts. Conceptually, what follows is understood best as analogous to an impressionist painting; not all the brush strokes perfectly align, but I hope it is still successful in communicating a kenotic way of life. What follows is a vision of perpetually emptying that is always draining the current state of affairs/what is. This kenotic action undermines in a cyclical, threefold manner that reveals deep existential meaning in every moment.
            Slingshotting us into the heart of the subject, Roger Haydon Mitchell, in his work Church, Gospel, and Empire, proposes a concept of kenarchy, “a composite of the Greek words kenō to empty and arkhō to rule.”[2] His major theological move is beginning with Jesus of Nazareth: “[i]nstead of putting the emphasis on the concept of God and explicating kenosis as the emptying out of the supposed attributes of divine power, it [kenarchy] puts the accent on the self-giving, loving behaviour of Jesus and, rather, reinvests that into the nature of transcendence.”[3] Jesus, therefore, acts as Mitchell’s a priori assertion from which everything must follow. Kenosis, thus interpreted, “is taken to be the appropriate depiction for the overall tenor of the whole Jesus narrative...The particular advantage of this interpretation of kenosis is that, by being thus placed at the opposite pole to imperial sovereignty, it provides for its effective dismissal.”[4] Moreover, his a priori ensures an eternal consistency within God, stating, “[i]t is this kenotic choice to love that arguing from Jesus to God makes permanent. God, understood in this sense, is the God of the eternal decision to love.”[5] Through this lens, Mitchell re-interprets much of the Christian tradition as a “lapsis” and conflation of transcendence and sovereignty. This provides him with an interpretive opening, wherein “[l]ife-laying-down loving becomes the telos and motif from which all cultural, political, and creational life is ordered.”[6]
            Mitchell goes on to highlight the existential, situational, and political understanding of the incarnation. He states, “[i]n the kenarchic understanding of the incarnation...a complete abandonment into the fullness of the self-emptying, life-laying-down power encountered in the incarnation event is proposed.”[7] Mitchell’s kenarchy drains kenosis all the way; it is not partial, nor limited, and it requires everything. His situating of the incarnation ensures that “everything” includes a robust political challenge. “Set in the context of Jesus’ confrontation with the powers, the incarnation is displayed as an overwhelmingly loving manifestation of power in direct confrontation of the Roman regime. The Jesus event thus names and calls for an ongoingly kenotic manifestation of power in direct contrast with hierarchical authority.”[8] He does not shy away from the ramifications of this thought: “[t]he assertion of kenosis consequent on arguing from Jesus to the divine, confronts the inception of the nation state and its responsibility for the multiplication of sovereignty through law, war, and money.”[9] Thus, Mitchell’s work helps confront the “non-negotiable” aspects of our culture: nation states, capitalism, and liberal democracy.[10]
Mitchell’s kenarchy fails to answer sufficiently why hierarchy is a reality, as arguing from Jesus to God places a non-hierarchal figure as central. However, I think an answer to why hierarchy exists could be formulated based on sin as a distancing construct – an idea to which I will return later. Whatever the case, imagining a politic that places kenosis as central will run into difficulty when drained all the way. Such a politic encounters the problem of deconstructing deconstruction, or emptying emptiness, which ends up with nothing! One might say the disappearing politic is the kenotic politic![11]
A disappearing politic may, at first, make us quite nervous. However, a moment of reflection on imposed Christian politics wedded to hierarchal power may make us equally uneasy. Whether John Calvin’s Geneva, or Georg W. H. Hegel’s actualization of Reason in Prussia, the attempts by Christians to impose an overly realized eschatology through political means have had disastrous results.[12] John Calvin’s involvement in the execution of Michael Servetus, or Hegel’s sentiment regarding the importance of the march of Reason that is evident in his writing may cause us to pause – “[b]ut so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower – crush to pieces man an object in its path.”[13] In each of these examples, I would characterize the endeavour as a filling/maintaining/building without the necessary emptying, as they exhibit traits of attempting to enforce an idea by using power over another human. Therefore, no matter how uncomfortable it might be to imagine a politic of emptying, it may be a necessary premise for a future politic.
Here we find ourselves at the ever-tenuous question, how is Christianity/Christ to relate to culture? Specifically, we are currently located between a self-dissolving politic and an unsatisfactory alignment with hierarchical power. H. Richard Niebuhr’s five types, in his work Christ & Culture, demonstrate the plethora of Christian responses to this question throughout history and in the current context. Christ against culture, Christ of culture, Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ the transformer of culture, all leave something to be desired and none place kenosis as the central element of their schema.[14] Therefore, I propose that the imaginative task of a kenotic politic requires a more fluid type, which will enable it to take on a perpetual emptying. Therefore, I think we need to begin, not with the ontological, nor the metaphysical, but with what is.[15] That which requires emptying already is. As such, I propose that we draw on the Old Testament triplet of prophet, priest, and king, to assist our imagining of a threefold emptying. In such a plan, it is possible to retain a church-state divide while acknowledging that both institutions/ecclesia are highly political. In a triplet, the kenotic action has the potential to undermine perpetually the hierarchical conceptions of power, politics, and attempts at hegemony. Thus, whatever is is precisely what requires emptying.

A contemporary example of kenotic/undermining/subversive/emptying political action occurs in the art and music of Lady Gaga. In order to grasp the nature of Lady Gaga’s art, and its political elements, one must consider the religious (priestly and prophetic) nature of her work. Part of the publicity hype around the release of her single “Judas” from her then upcoming album Born This Way, was a tweet that included the statement “Pop culture is our religion.”[16] Her concerts enact this religion as her “Little Monsters” come and worship with their high priestess, “Mother Monster,” and the message is conveyed through her songs. The song “Judas,” once released, acted as commentary on betrayal, love, and the intimate connection between the two. Lyrics such as “I’ll wash his feet with my hair if he needs, Forgive him when his tongue lies through his brain, Even after three times he betrays me”[17] quite explicitly tie themselves to Christian images and narratives. The rest of the album took on social issues about which political and organized religious action was thought to be too slow, most notably the social inclusion of the LGBT community through the title track “Born this Way.” Thus, Gaga’s music came to function as a prophetic critique of the political and religious malaise through facilitating an unwanted conversation. Thus, by using what is, the social sway of pop-culture, she consciously subverted the dominant political hegemony through the vehicle of a parallel discourse – pop music.
More recently, Gaga has again stirred the kenotic/political melting pot with her single “Do What U Want” from her album ArtPop. The song, and her performance of it at the American Music Awards, may grate against our lingering puritan sensibilities; but it subversively offers insight into politics and sexuality as well as a profoundly Christian duality - physical affirmation and denial. The release of the song was preceded by a series of tweets about the worst things previously said regarding her in the media. They included her weight, similarity to Madonna, sexuality, speculative drug use, and relation to God.[18] Against this context, her lyrics gain a new poignancy.[19]
Write what you want
Say what you want 'bout me
If you wanna know that I'm not sorry
Do what you want
What you want with my body
What you want with my body
You can't have my heart
And you won't use my mind but
Do what you want (with my body)

Her performance of this song at the American Music Awards added a further layer of text to the political subversion (kenosis) occurring in her art. Gaga’s Marilyn Monroe style, the use of a presidential character, and the betrayal of Gaga to retain power, when so explicitly shown unmasks the horror of the current system and thereby empties it of its power.[20] This song, Gaga’s use of media, and her performance at the American Music Awards can all be understood as using what is - music, media, and performance art – to undermine itself, as well as the political and religious understandings and meanings attached to the dominant social structures. This self-conscious self-negation of form, message, medium, and self, drives at the heart of a kenotic politic.
            Let us now return to some biblical images of continual emptying and repetition as ways of conceiving this kenotic politic. In 1 Kings 17:7-16 there is the story of Elijah and the jar of oil that does not run out, and throughout Luke-Act there is the refrain “filled with the Holy Spirit...spoke/exclaimed/prophesied/etc.”; both the image and refrain tie together the filling act of God and the pouring out that involves humans. Furthermore, repetition is also no stranger to the biblical text, whether it is the threefold repetition of judgements in the book of revelation, told from three perspectives, or the fourfold (number of creation) telling of Jesus’ life in the Gospels.[21] These images begin to challenge a linear-structural mindset, displacing it with a more cyclical-fluid understanding. These two understandings of time are held together texts like Galatians 4:4-5 (NRSV), “[b]ut when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children.” This text draws on Jesus’ moment in history, which was one of transition from oriental orientation (eastward and cyclical – ex. Alexander the Great and Buddhism) to an occidental orientation (westward and linear – ex. Paul’s evangelism goal of Spain/end of the world and western civilization). A duality held together in images of continual pouring (linear) and repetitions (cyclical).[22]
However, is my reaffirmation of oriental cyclical thought into a kenotic politic not a resignation to existing in Buddhist samsara (cyclical existence)? No, I think there is a way to retain a subject through an existential understanding of exposure to the Real. This individuation occurs through a kenotic politic that empties itself all the way and risks exposing oneself the Real enabled by the shedding of structure. Slavoj Žižek writes, “[i]n sex as well as in politics, we take refuge in catastrophic scenarios in order to avoid the actual deadlock.”[23] In this statement he nears the truth of a structural politic, for catastrophe deflects our attention. Catastrophe can act as a “building up,” or an attempt to distance us from the Real. For example, 9/11 and the ensuing “war on terror” successfully distanced and abstracted war and trauma, thereby building both psychological (terror) and physical (drones) distance into the subsequent actions. In love catastrophe obfuscates the “until death,” and in politics it hides the “here and now.” As mentioned above, if we consider sin as a blocking of relationship, or a “bunkering down” within ourselves rejecting the love offered to us or the real pain, death, and rawness of life, then it is a barrier to our identification as a self through a blockade against the chance of being radically exposed to the Real. In politics, this blockade occurs in structures, halls of power, systems that destroy individuality turning people into numbers and never risking a real relation, much less risking death. Žižek, working though a discussion of art, explains it this way: “[i]t should thus be clear how the standard notion of artistic beauty [or structural politic] as a utopian false escape from the constraints of reality falls short: one should distinguish between ordinary escapism and this dimension of Otherness, this magic moment when the Absolute appears in all it fragility.”[24] Thus, in the continual kenotic act we near the Absolute, the identifier, which redeems the self from nothingness.
Exploring these same nihilistic depths, John D. Caputo implores, “[l]et us expose ourselves to the terrible trauma of the real, our heads bloodied but unbowed by the degree zero of being-nothing.”[25] In the depths of a complete kenosis there is the resound, “Here we are. We are still here.”[26] Imagery that calls to mind Hans Urs Von Balthasar’s provocative insight into the Christ event, “the wound inflicted on world history by the coming of Christ continues to fester.”[27] It is a messy business following this kenotic path, but somewhere in this perpetual emptying there is meaning. Caputo goes on, “[w]e should live as if we live not. We should live as if we were no longer here, which means to live with an appreciation of the opportune moment that has been granted to us by the cosmos here and now. We should live in such a way that what we buy and accumulate should not prove to be a distraction to life itself, which is here today and gone tomorrow.”[28] It is a sentiment that appears to parallel that of 2 Peter 3:10-13, where the logic does not follow “it is all going to burn so do anything,” rather the incredibly transitory nature of everything is invoked as reason for transformative living. Caputo continues with this seemingly inverse logic, “I propose a kind of joyous and gratuitous nihilism, a celebratory nihilism of grace, where life is lived for nothing other than itself. Life is for free, not because it is without cost but because it is free from any “for,” because it is “for” nothing, for nothing else. It is an excess, a gratuity, a graciousness, a grace. This grace of its “being-for-nothing” had to do with the “event.”[29] As such, a life following a daring kenotic politic is not awaiting an eschatological political structure, but imbuing every moment with kenarchic potential.
            In a kenotic way of life, we are perpetually poured out, undermining what is, and in the act of emptying, we are reminded to break our solipsistic tendencies. Judith Butler has popularized a form of ethical thought around the recognition of the other. She writes, “Emanuel Levinas offers a conception of ethics that rests upon an apprehension for the precariousness of life, one that begins with the precarious life of the Other.”[30] Similar to the existential discussion above, the uncertainty of existence (found through kenotic/deconstructive endeavours) posits meaning through confronting/being exposed to the other; a sentiment captured in her statement, “one is undone, in the face of the other, by the touch, by the scent, by the feel.”[31] This statement is also represented virtually as an Internet meme regarding an otter.[32]  

Drawing on the cultural cache of the Judeo-Christian tradition and its relational derivation of meaning, this piece utilizes the platform of Internet to confront the viewer with his or her own alienation and aloneness. It does so at the precise moment of viewing, as often Internet viewing is an internally numbing and highly individualistic experience. This picture and play on words undermines the glorification of the Internet experience by revealing one’s own internal abyss through a confrontation with the external/natural world, while simultaneously calling for a giving act of emotive love to the beauty depicted. As such, it functions as another example cultural subversion, through a kenotic call or prophetic critique, which occurs in what is (the Internet) while at the same time emptying it of its dominating power.
            Can death bring life? Yes, I think a politic of threefold kenotic self-giving and existential self-negation that unmasks the Real can bring life, real tangible life, and maybe even a “fuller” version than the current expression! However, regarding the dilemma of imparting a kenotic politic to it to another person, I think I can only do so by invitation. Judith Butler poses an apt question this way, “the Spinozists, the Nietzscheans, the utilitarians, and the Freudians all ask, ‘Can I invoke the imperative to preserve the life of the Other even if I cannot invoke this right of self-preservation for myself?’”[33] My response, following kenosis, would be “No, one can only sacrifice.” This is precisely why a kenotic ethic, one of self-emptying, cannot also stand as a structural politic. The imperative to self-empty appears oxymoronic, parasitical of the current is, constantly cyclical, and utterly arcane to those not grasped by the beauty of the vision. Nevertheless, for those grasped, we desire its coming. “So while the opportune moment is still available to us, let us say yes to life, viens, oui, oui.[34]




By Silas Krabbe
Bibliography


Bauckham, Richard. The Theology of the Book of Revelation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London ; New York: Verso, 2006.

Caputo, John D. The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

“Discourse on the Otter.” Discourse on the Otter, October 25, 2012. http://discourseontheotter.tumblr.com/post/34328260870/judith-butler.

Gaga, Lady. Judas. Interscope Records, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wagn8Wrmzuc.

———. “Tweet: Fat,” October 20, 2013. https://twitter.com/ladygaga/status/391991925584056320.

———. “Tweet: Judas,” April 25, 2011. https://twitter.com/ladygaga/status/62745183992815616.

Harmon, Abigail. Conversation, December 2, 2013.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004.

Mitchell, Roger Haydon. Church, Gospel, and Empire: How the Politics of Sovereignty Impregnated the West. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2011.

Niebuhr, H. Richard. Christ and Culture. San Francisco: Harper One, 2001.

Ris, Duncan. Conversation, October 24, 2013.

Von Balthasar, Hans Urs. Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory. Translated by Graham Harrison. Vol. I–V. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988.

Yates, David. Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2, 2011.

Yoder, John Howard. The Politics of Jesus. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972.

Žižek, Slavoj. The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? London ; New York: Verso, 2000.



[1] David Yates, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2, 2011.
[2] Roger Haydon Mitchell, Church, Gospel, and Empire: How the Politics of Sovereignty Impregnated the West (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2011), 174.
[3] Ibid., 172–173.
[4] Ibid., 173.
[5] Ibid., 194.
[6] Ibid., 174.
[7] Ibid., 192.
[8] Ibid., 193.
[9] Ibid., 182.
[10] This challenge to the dominant structures of our society is something upon which Judith Butler indirectly reflects. “If national sovereignty is challenged, that does not mean it must be shored up at all costs, if that results in suspending civil liberties and suppressing political dissent. Rather, the dislocation from First World privilege [referencing September 11th], however temporary, offers a challenge to start to imagine a world in which that violence might be minimized, in which an inevitable interdependency become acknowledged as the basis for global political community.” Thus, Butler is able to see the opportunity that resides within moments of crisis, an opportunity we ought not to miss. Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London ; New York: Verso, 2006), XII–XIII.
[11] This is idea/image of complete emptiness is not foreign to Christian thought. Consider the torn curtain of the Holy of Holies, which revealed the “nothingness” of the deity (not)contained.
[12] Nelson Mandela’s recent death reminds us again of the abuse of power. For it was against an apartheid system propped up by reformed theology that Mandela fought.
[13] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 32.
[14] H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (San Francisco: Harper One, 2001).
[15] Works such as John D. Caputo’s Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event and Catherine Keller’s Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming argue persuasively for such an approach by against a premise of creation ex nihilo. I acknowledge that such approaches are no doubt contentious as they challenge long-held Christian beliefs.
[16] Lady Gaga, “Tweet: Judas,” April 25, 2011, https://twitter.com/ladygaga/status/62745183992815616.
[17] Lady Gaga, Judas (Interscope Records, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wagn8Wrmzuc.
[18] Lady Gaga, “Tweet: Fat,” October 20, 2013, https://twitter.com/ladygaga/status/391991925584056320. Regarding these tweets, Duncan Ris drew a parallel between the self-giving physicality of Jesus that did not retain anything; and in such a giving, was able to affirm the ideas and way of life he had lived, even unto death. Duncan Ris, Conversation, October 24, 2013. This physicality reminds us of the absolute us seriousness with which Jesus said to take up our cross. An action that is tied to the confession of Jesus as Christ, Luke 9:18-27. John H. Yoder notes that it is following this confession that there are signs the disciples may be unwilling to follow Christ’s way of suffering. John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972), 42.
[19] Reading Lady Gaga’s art in context has become increasingly important, to no small extent because of her collaborative relationship with performance artist Marina Abramović. This of course heightens the awareness of sometime conflicting interpretations, between those that search for Gaga’s intent and those that rely more heavily on reader’s response.
[20] In a conversation with Abigail, she pointed out the striking similarities between the denial of Gaga in the performance and the denial of Jesus by Peter. Abigail Harmon, Conversation, December 2, 2013.
[21] Richard Bauckham, The Theology of the Book of Revelation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 40, 67.
[22] I am also tempted to posit a more speculative/absurdist argument following Hegel. Hegel’s Philosophy of History traces the hegemonic march of Reason’s actualization in history, from the Orient, to Greece, to Rome, to Germany, and then nearing the Absolute in the Prussian state. A march that he “foretold” would continue westward, “America is therefore the land of the future.” Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 86. If I take Hegel’s logic one-step further, pushing past the westward limit, I end up back in the east affirming, to some extent, a cyclical mode of thought.
[23] Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London ; New York: Verso, 2000), 78.
[24] Ibid., 159.
[25] John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 223.
[26] Ibid., 224.
[27] Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. Graham Harrison, vol. I–V (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), III, 25.
[28] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 225.
[29] Ibid., 240.
[30] Butler, Precarious Life, XVII–XVIII. This point of otherness is also highlighted for kenarchy in Mitchell, Church, Gospel, and Empire, 185ff.
[31] Butler, Precarious Life, 24.
[32] “Discourse on the Otter,” Discourse on the Otter, October 25, 2012, http://discourseontheotter.tumblr.com/post/34328260870/judith-butler.
[33] Butler, Precarious Life, 140.
[34] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 225.

Word, words, and the Emptying Thereof: Caputo as Exploratory Theologian


Preamble:

I wrote this paper for Loren Wilkinson’s Kenosis, Creation, and Culture seminar this past fall. It assumes an understanding of kenosis, a term meaning emptying, lowering, or abdication, used by Paul in his letter to the Philippians to describe the incarnation. My goal in the paper was to introduce the thought of John D. Caputo to the class as a conversation partner whose work and ideas I thought would assist us in thinking through a kenotic lens. In this paper I attempt to parallel stylistically Caputo’s own progression of thought and style; to that end I have attempted to develop the style and tone throughout. Caputo’s academic career has progressed from classical scholarly endeavours to his pioneering of “weak theology,” which he communicates through theopoetics. His writing has grown increasingly rhapsodic and poetic, especially in his latest works The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event and The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps, wherein he plays fast and loose with language and theological presuppositions. As such, my paper is written differently than a typical academic paper. I am not going to pin down and define words in an established manner. Instead, I will use the slipperiness of language to my advantage; recognizing that within each word there is a surplus of meaning.  This surplus causes definitions to remain somewhat loose, and in this looseness a world of possibilities is opened up. Throughout this paper I am embracing this world as a space in which to dwell. As a listener or reader it is okay to be confused – it is part of the point. The confusion is not to obscure intentionally, but to provide a new space in which to think new thoughts. So I invite you to follow me through the paper, as it grows increasingly rhapsodic, wandering down a path that might not, at first glance, appear to be a fruitful one.  
 

Word, words, and the Emptying Thereof:

Caputo as Exploratory Theologian


A W/word contains a call, a haunt, a spook that lures toward the event within, perhaps. Grasping the previous sentence requires an understanding of the theological setting and intellectual space of John D. Caputo, the founder of “weak theology.” In order to grasp these ideas one must cover a significant amount of cerebral landscape, which will enable a parallel to be drawn between kenotic theology and Caputo’s weak theology. Through a historical survey of influential ideas, the landscape begins to take the shape of continental philosophy. Details of the vegetation emerge in a distinction between the forest and trees through an interaction with semiotics and the use of language. Entering the thought of Caputo himself, deconstruction by way of a detour through two French thinkers uproots and alters the forest in such a way as to reveal parallel paths: kenotic and weak. Caputo continues down the spookier path of weak theology, engaging the dangers along the way. This path includes tiptoeing through the valley of the “Death of God” to emerge on the other side only to find that God does not exist, so much as God insists. The landscapes, and the journey within it, lead Caputo out into an open plateau of theopoetics and a theology of “perhaps.” This plateau provides Evangelical kenotic thinkers with some previously undiscovered resources, and various paths to consider.  
Caputo, a Roman Catholic from Philadelphia, writes penetrating postmodern theology. He is a continental philosopher, writing American continental philosophical theology[1] influenced by the French philosophical tradition of the late twentieth century. Three elements define Caputo’s theology as postmodern. First, the hermeneutical turn, following Martin Heidegger, is the realization that “[w]e ‘always already’ are the beings that we are,” or in Donna Haraway’s words, he takes seriously the situated nature of all knowledges.[2] Second, the linguistic turn is that “[t]here is no such thing as a pure, private, pre-linguistic sphere.” [3] Therefore, progress occurs through creating new, more complex language that transforms previous ideas. Third, the revolutionary turn, following Thomas Kuhn, is an acknowledgement that “paradigm shifts” better account for the progression of ideas than does linear development, necessitating “revolutions” to break dominant paradigms.[4] Caputo’s postmodern incorporation of these three turns makes his thought innovative, even while being foreshadowed by key historical thinkers.
G. W. F. Hegel, for Caputo, begins the end of the Enlightenment. Caputo explains it this way,
[René] Descartes labored under a narrowly ahistorical and purely mathematical idea of reason; [Immanuel] Kant shrunk reason down to formal consistency and universality; and the British John Locke and David Hume confined reason to its blunter empirical applications. Against all this, Hegel showed that reason unfolds and develops in time, passing through several forms (Gestaltungen), and that it is realised in different ways, in different times and places.[5]

The importance of time, flux, change, and history, correspond with Caputo’s appreciation of situated thought. Caputo, however, is no classical Hegelian. Søren Kierkegaard’s stinging, satirical, and incisive critiques of Hegel’s interpretation of the Christian tradition undergird much of Caputo’s thought. Kierkegaard and Caputo see it as a laughable concept that the entire mystery of the Christian tradition was made plain by a Hegelian metaphysic.[6] Therefore, rather than achieving synthesis Caputo’s dialectic attempts to split down the middle, and in so doing resembles Kierkegaard’s unresolved dialectic.
Caputo applies his dialectic to language itself, with the assistance of Paul Ricoeur. Prior to the linguistic turn, individuals may have unthinkingly affirmed that religious words correspond with the Real. However, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur raise the awareness that a text does not have a single fixed meaning.[7] A text may have a meaning that one can approximate as the original, but a text also has a life beyond this first meaning. A rich text will have a subsequent history, through which it will continue to gain meaning.[8] To explore this meaning, Ricoeur turns to the symbolic nature of texts: “All symbolic language is a language which says something other than what it seems to say, and by its double meaning, releases meaning, releases signification.”[9] The meaning is then found within the symbol, which is not only limited to written texts; rather the “entirety of human existence is a text to be read.”[10] After this linguistic moment, two paths diverge, two ways of speaking. One can, like Ricoeur, empty words of direct relation to the Real, find multiple meanings, and follow the path of semiotics. Alternatively, one can attach epistemic degrees of certitude to words, concepts, and the relation between the word and the Real.[11] Caputo follows the first path, while process theologians, as an example, tend to follow the second.[12]
Caputo’s own intellectual development occurred in three major movements. His academic career began with “a more scientific, a more exegetical interpretation of the relationship between Heidegger and the religious tradition.”[13] Then in Radical Hermeneutics, he found his own voice.[14] The book moves from the “Repetition and the Genesis of Hermeneutics” in Kierkegaard, Edmond Husserl, and Heidegger through “Deconstruction and the Radicalization of Hermeneutics” in Jacques Derrida, concluding with a proposal of postmetaphysical rationality and an openness to mystery. Caputo, taking on his own project, distinctly entered his third phase in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion, and his subsequent theological treatise The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event, in which religious motifs become prominent spaces for postmetaphysical philosophy to play.[15] This playing occurs in the space opened up between signifiers such as sing/ring/king, in what Derrida calls différance, signalling a break from the structuralist hegemony of closed formalizable systems.[16]
Caputo utilizes postmetaphysical thought to retain the right to ask any question.[17] Metaphysics, from Caputo’s point of view, prevents such a radicalization of thought, as one inevitably will be pushed “back to the fold of metaphysics.”[18] In the space of postmetaphysical thought, one “cultivates an acute sense of the contingency of all social, historical, [and] linguistic structures.” This “radical” sense of contingency, occurring in the process of being unwrapped, opens one up to the risk of being exposed to the event harboured within each circumstance, word, and idea.[19] These weak events, I propose, are events haunted by kenotic thought.
An event, for Caputo, does not exist (in an onto-theo-logical state); events insist.[20] Therefore, to describe an event is an elusive task, for events are “what we cannot see coming,” and they “are not what happens but what is going on in what happens.”[21] The event is “something je ne sais quoi, something going on in what I desire.”[22] To get to this unknowable X, Caputo makes use of a form of Derridean deconstruction. Caputo frames deconstruction in the positive: “deconstruction must not be mistaken as something destructive or merely skeptical because at its heart deconstruction arises not from negation but from a deeper affirmation of something, I know not what, from a faith (foi) in an event, heeding a call, an exigency, a summons, an injunction, and imperative.”[23] It is the weak force of a call.
In Derridean deconstruction Caputo sees a biblical resonance. Deconstruction scoffs at universals and their hegemonic oppression; in a similar fashion the biblical tradition undermines absolutization through the upholding of the orphan and the alien.[24] Here in the undermining of universals, power, and strong forces, one can draw the connection between kenotic thought and Caputo’s weak theology. As stated, the parallel occurs through Derrida, but in order to understand Derrida a detour through the thought of Emmanuel Levinas is helpful. Derrida’s relationship to Levinas’s thought became clearer in late 1980s, when Derrida began writing about more patently religious ideas such as gift and forgiveness.[25]      
Levinas enables Derrida, and subsequently Caputo, to use kenotic thought without affirming a metaphysic or the cosmology implied in Paul’s use of the word kenosis in Philippians 2:7. Levinas, in his essay “Judaism and Kenosis,” argues that the ramifications (or traits) of kenotic thought exist within Judaism without needing an incarnation.[26] Levinas states, “[t]erms evoking Divine Majesty and loftiness are often followed or preceded by those describing a God bending down to look at human misery or inhabiting that misery.”[27] Levinas goes even further in saying “there is an inseparable bond between God’s descent and his elevation.”[28] It is a bond necessarily manifested in God’s affinity in suffering.[29]
Levinas’s kenotic thought plays out in Caputo’s “hieranarche,” the holy disturbance and disarray that occurs when exposed to the event that is harboured within the name of the Kingdom of God. Levinas develops his kenotic ideas through the parable “The Moon that makes itself little.”[30] It is a parable of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi that includes a discussion between the Moon and the Creator, which explains why, of the two lights created in Genesis 1:16, one had to be lesser and the other greater. The Moon makes the astute observation that two kings cannot wear the same crown; the Creator’s reply is that this is indeed the case and since the Moon recognized this incompatibility of equals, the Moon should make itself smaller. This “discussion” occurs in between the first part of the verse, where the two lights are created, and the second part where they are distinguished as greater and lesser. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi then connects this declaration of God to the Moon to a textual variant in Numbers 28:15, a variant that can render the verse as a pronouncement that an offering needs to be offered as “a sin-offering on behalf of the Eternal.” When read this way, an offering on behalf of God is offered to make amends to the Moon because the Moon was told to become lesser. It is a complete “disordering” of the hierarchy, which Levinas then parallels with kenosis, stating “[h]ierarchy is necessary, but I can already see that it is necessarily unjust.”[31] The story, for Levinas, reveals a “glorious lowering” – that is a scandal to reason – and necessarily confuses the ontology of being when viewed as hierarchical. Caputo, not affirming kenosis and its metaphysical or ontological hierarchy from Philippians 2:6–11, begins from the end-point of a Levinasian kenotic understanding where the ontological hierarchy is already undermined. Therefore, one can understand Caputo’s weak theology as being analogous, mutatis mutandis, to Sarah Coakley’s third way of utilizing the term kenosis – that being when the term and concept of kenosis are useful in paradigmatic or illustrative ways when addressing God’s relation to the world.[32]
Instead of kenotic, Caputo views his theology as “a theology of the cross.”[33] What occurred on the cross, in Caputo’s view, was not a veiled omnipotent power, but a weak power writ large. Therefore, he thinks Slavoj Žižek is only half-right to say the perversion of Christianity is that through the cross humanity learns that there is no Big Other. The other half is that in this abandonment lies the weak force of God.[34] Therefore, Caputo takes seriously texts like:
For God’s foolishness is wiser than human wisdom,
and God’s weakness is stronger than human strength...
But God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong;
God chose what is low and despised [ta agene] in the world,
Things that are not [ta me onta],
To reduce to nothing things that are [ta onta].
(1 Cor. 1:25, 27–28 )[35]

The power of God, in light of such texts, is redefined to be an unconditional promise without overwhelming force.[36] The promise, or event that calls from within the name of God, is the possibility of the impossible.[37] It is a call into the future, a call to realize what was previously considered impossible.[38] Following Derrida, such a conception enables the possibility of hope, for “[h]ope is hope only when it is not permitted.”[39] In other words, to hope is to hope against hope for the impossible![40]
Searching for the impossible, Caputo often “plays” with French, Greek, and Latin words in the style of the French linguistic deconstructionalists, shedding the excess to expose the event within. It is a language of without – or paralleling kenotic thought, it is an empty language – a language that Caputo describes as silence: “Silence is language, but it is language without language.”[41] Yet, silence “is not to be taken as a simple or absolute silence, an escape from language into the Mystical Secret, a mystical hors-texte, but rather as a linguistic operation transpiring in the inner chambers and most secret resources of textuality and écriture.”[42] It is a silence that cuts! Caputo can then read Meister Eckhart’s prayer, “God rid me of God,” as a prayer that splits between the binary of “Being” and “Nothing”[43] – a dangerous prayer that “tears”[44] toward the harboured event.
            This dangerous “tear” attempts to cut between faith and reason, not wanting to choose. Yet, the danger is not only to beliefs, but also to oneself, as Ricoeur’s linguistic turn was also an existential one. “That is to say, the dialogue of the believer and the atheist is not—anymore—a dialogue with the other, but a dialogue with oneself.”[45] This existential turn blends kenosis and semiotics in the work of “Christian Atheists,” who have grappled with the ramifications of this turn. “Whether it is Žižek’s double kenosis, Caputo’s highest contradiction, or [Peter] Rollins’s a/theistic approach, there is surely a God that is beyond the theist and the atheist, the knowable and the unknowable, the past and the future, and so on, until all dyadic forms have been exhausted.”[46] This turn is a type of “Death of God” theology, yet an important distinction lies between Caputo/Žižek/Rollins and “Death of God” more classically articulated by Thomas J. J. Altizer/Mark Taylor. The former may all be described as “rightly passing” as both atheist and Christian. The latter, however, use a Hegelian metaphysic or “dissolve” to speak of God’s disappearance into the world without remainder as occurring through “kenosis as a zero-sum game in which the transfer of being is made at the expense of the ‘religion of the father’ and to the advantage of his local incarnation.”[47] Into this context, Caputo offers the adverb “perhaps” and its negation “perhaps not.”[48] This weak adverbial duality assists in the weakening of binaries. Catherine Keller sees such movements as positive: “The more theology absorbs the methods of deconstruction and pluralism, the more the opposition between secularism and religion can itself be deconstructed.”[49] Such a movement loosens the grip of absolutism within both philosophy and theology.
            Caputo offers kenotic thinkers the gift of his theopoetics, in that it conveys a different understanding of God than previous languages laden with hierarchy.[50] The usefulness of the weak verbs and adverbs of “insistence,” “call,” “haunt,” and “perhaps” unfold a horizon of new conceptions with which to speak of the event harboured in the name of God or even a re-imbibed metaphysical God, perhaps.
Theopoetics has the potential for a wide range of applications. For example, considering politics Caputo states, “a reformation of political thought would require not ridding ourselves of theology but rather reexamining our theological presuppositions and learning to think about theology differently, which means to think about God otherwise, to reimagine God.”[51] This is a future about which Caputo muses, “[w]hat would it be like were there a politics of and for the children, who are the future; a politics not of sovereignty, of top-down power, but a politics that builds from the bottom up, where ta me onta (I Cor 1:28) enjoy pride of place and a special privilege?”[52] In such a vision, “the weakness of God is not the last word but the first, coming as a call or provocation that solicits our response, our witness to the call, which is what comes next, like an ‘amen’ or a second yes.”[53] This is a politics of a time oriented to the future, one that remembers, while looking forward to heal.[54]Viens, oui, oui.[55]
Furthermore, a kenotic, or weak, theology perhaps opens up space for a more humble engagement with the other. Consider, as Caputo does, “Derrida’s famous saying that he ‘rightly passes’ for an atheist, meaning that atheism is a belief which must be weakened and made porous so as not to close off the underlying event of faith.”[56] If such a notion were able to permeate the strong theologies of confessional congregations perhaps it would enable Evangelicalism to be spooked by the event in the other in such a way as to engage more humbly and offer hospitality to all of creation.[57]
            Perhaps the “other” engaged by weak, or kenotic, theology is method itself. In the reading of all reality as symbol, along with Ricoeur, might one not also seek the event harboured within method itself? If so, would not a method that followed kenosis be more in line with the power of weakness that shames the strong? Could one’s method be shaped without enacting a “power over” through epistemic certitude, embodying a ta me onta instead of a ta onta epistemology? Would not a weak method that haunts and calls look very different from realism, or even critical realism? Perhaps.
            Caputo treads the murky waters of postmodern religious thought, situated in his own particular moment with the river of his tradition behind him. It is from these depths he charts out a provocative philosophical theology, a voyage upon which one may choose to embark. These waters appear to have navigational challenges at every turn; however, the course appears to parallel, at least in some respects, the kenotic map previously explored in the Christian tradition. This congruency does not disperse the dangers, yet it appears to hold promise, perhaps. Like every great expedition, Caputo embarks/concludes with a prayer:[58]
I am praying not to be lost, praying because I am already lost, praying not to get any more lost than I already am, praying that my prayer does not make things worse. I am trying to think while praying, to pray while thinking, praying like mad – for theology, for theology’s truth, for the event.[59]

By Silas Krabbe

Bibliography



Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. Edited by Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas F Torrance. Vol. I–IV. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2010.

Caputo, John D. After The Death of God. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

———. More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000.

———. Philosophy and Theology. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006.

———. Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987.

———. The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

———. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.

———. The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Caputo, John D., and Catherine Keller. “Theopoetic/Theopolitic.” Crosscurrents, Winter 2007. http://www.crosscurrents.org/Caputo0406.pdf (accessed October 18, 2013).

Clayton, Philip. “Religion and Science.” Video Lecture. Mission Soulutions. Accessed October 25, 2013. http://www.missionsoulutions.com/partners/homebrewed-christianity.

Coakley, Sarah. “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations.” In The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001.

Cobb, John B. Whitehead Word Book: A Glossary with Alphabetical Index to Technical Terms in Process and Realilty. Claremont, CA: P & F Press, 2008.

Fuller, Tripp. John Caputo on the Journey from Radical Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God [Barrel Aged]. Podcast. Homebrewed Christianity. Accessed October 15, 2013. http://homebrewedchristianity.com/2013/10/02/john-caputo-on-the-journey-form-radical-hermenutics-to-the-weakness-of-god-barrel-aged/.

Kennel, Maxwell. “The Highest Contradiction: The Dyadic Form of St. Paul Among the Philosophers.” The Other Journal, October 19, 2010. http://theotherjournal.com/2010/10/19/the-highest-contradiction-the-dyadic-form-of-st-paul-among-the-philosophers/.

Lévinas, Emmanuel. In The Time of The Nations. Translated by Michael B. Smith. London: Continuum, 2007.

Putt, B. Keith. “What Do I Love When I Love My God?: An Interview with John D. Caputo.” In Religion With/Out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo, edited by James H. Olthuis. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Ricoeur, Paul. “Two Essays By Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and The Language of Faith.” Translated by R. Bradley DeFord. Union Seminary Quarterly Review 28 (1973): 203–224.



[1] Caputo’s discourse, philosophical theology, is mainly governed by philosophy as the limiter and definer of the discourse, contrasting theological philosophy; though Caputo argues, the two are never truly distinct. John D. Caputo, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006), 44.
[2] Ibid., 45.
[3] Ibid., 46.
[4] Ibid., 47–48.
[5] Ibid., 39.
[6] Ibid., 42.
[7] Caputo relies more heavily on Jacques Derrida and Heidegger than he does on Hans-Georg Gadamer or Ricoeur, as he does not see them as being radical enough. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 5. However, for the purpose of this paper Ricoeur can/will assist in understanding the linguistic turn to semiotics.
[8] Tripp Fuller, John Caputo on the Journey from Radical Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God [Barrel Aged], Podcast, Homebrewed Christianity, accessed October 15, 2013, http://homebrewedchristianity.com/2013/10/02/john-caputo-on-the-journey-form-radical-hermenutics-to-the-weakness-of-god-barrel-aged/.
[9] Paul Ricoeur, “Two Essays By Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and The Language of Faith,” trans. R. Bradley DeFord, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 28, (1973): 220–221. The turn to linguistics is a re-direction Ricoeur made while responding to the Masters of Suspicion: Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud, who critiqued the origin, not content, of the text.
[10] Ibid., 223.
[11] Philip Clayton, “Religion and Science,” Video Lecture, Mission Soulutions, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.missionsoulutions.com/partners/homebrewed-christianity.
[12] Evangelicals have tended to ignore that this linguistic turn has taken place and tend to want to say all things with absolute certainty. When they do plunge into these waters with seriousness, they tend to follow Thomas Reid and Scottish common sense realism. It is a strain of thought currently being re-popularized by Reformed epistemologists.
[13] B. Keith Putt, “What Do I Love When I Love My God?: An Interview with John D. Caputo,” in Religion With/Out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo, ed. James H. Olthuis (New York: Routledge, 2002), 150.
[14] Ibid., 151.
[15] John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).
[16] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 24.
[17] Derrida defined philosophy as “the right to ask any question,” Caputo then applies the “right to ask any question” to theology. John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 69; Fuller, John Caputo on the Journey from Radical Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God [Barrel Aged]. Before dismissing postmetaphysical thought too quickly, Karl Barth is also “postmetaphysical” though for different reasons. Oversimplifying, Barth attempts to do theology without philosophy or metaphysic so that all action is from the side of God, whereas to impose a metaphysic would necessitate putting human thought before Revelation. Caputo, taking the other side, utilizes postmetaphysical thought to reflect back upon humanity, to allow for a human way of speaking.
[18] Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 6.
[19] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 63. “Radical” when used by Caputo is used in this way of being radically exposed, rather than using “radical” etymologically as getting back to the “root.”
[20] Ibid., 82.
[21] Ibid., 82–83. Thus, event spoke of by Caputo is different from Barth’s event of revelation as a happening within space-time that corresponds to an eternal decision in the will of God. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas F Torrance (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2010), 2:262. Caputo’s event is also different from event in process theology, in which event is occasions that make up stable entities. John B Cobb, Whitehead Word Book: A Glossary with Alphabetical Index to Technical Terms in Process and Realilty (Claremont, CA: P & F Press, 2008), 23.
[22] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 84. Events are always contained in, but not by their signifiers.
[23] Ibid., 73. Foi (faith) is different from croyance (beliefs). Croyance is the definitive strong beliefs (credos), while foi is more applicable to the event, especially in faith’s wishing the event to come. Thus, one can be a croyance atheist, but affirm the foi, thereby undermining the binary.
[24] Fuller, John Caputo on the Journey from Radical Hermeneutics to the Weakness of God [Barrel Aged].
[25] Ibid.
[26] Emmanuel Lévinas, In The Time of The Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Continuum, 2007).
[27] Ibid., 101. “Thus, in verse 3 of Psalm 147, ‘He who healeth the broken in heart, and bindeth up their wounds’ is the same one who, in the following verse, ‘counteth the number of the stars, and giveth them all their names’” (102).
[28] Ibid., 102.
[29] Ibid., 116. Levinas, having previously rooted ontology in the human, stating, “[t]he human is the possibility of a being-for-the-other” (112), doubles the suffering of God in comparison to one’s own. Since one must be-for-the-other, one does not pray for oneself. Rather, “[o]ne prays for oneself with the intention of suspending the suffering of God, who suffers in my suffering . . . who suffers both for man’s sin and for the suffering of his atonement” (116).
[30] Ibid., 103–105.
[31] Ibid., 104.
[32] Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis: Theological Meanings and Gender Connotations,” in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 193. The other two ways that kenosis is used, according to Coakley, are Christological and Trinitarian.
[33] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 41.
[34] Ibid., 43. The Big Other is a god who works deus ex machina (God from the machine), a God who is as a “device” that comes in and solves the protagonist’s problems to resolve the conflict in a plot arch.
[35] Ibid., 23.
[36] Ibid., 90.
[37] Ibid., 88.
[38] Ibid., 249.
[39] Ibid., 247.
[40] See Romans 4:18 “In hope against hope he believed . . .” NASB
[41] John D. Caputo, More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 250.
[42] Ibid. Gr. hors-texte = inserts, Fr. écriture = writing.
[43] Ibid., 255.
[44] “Tears” can be read with a dual meaning, since the “cut” toward we-know-not-what will involve the “cries” of those engaged. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, 340.
[45] Ricoeur, “Two Essays By Paul Ricoeur: The Critique of Religion and The Language of Faith,” 204.
[46] Maxwell Kennel, “The Highest Contradiction: The Dyadic Form of St. Paul Among the Philosophers,” The Other Journal, October 19, 2010, http://theotherjournal.com/2010/10/19/the-highest-contradiction-the-dyadic-form-of-st-paul-among-the-philosophers/. These are various ways of discussing the internal human duality between faith and doubt, faith and belief, or God and the self. Specifically, kenosis plays a role in Žižek’s understanding: “Žižek also reiterates the argument that he presented in The Monstrosity of Christ for a “double kenotic” dialectical understanding of God’s contradictory nature. Instead of seeing God as the simple “unity of opposites” (as Caputo may have us do), Žižek suggests that in God there is “dialectical relationship between the Universal and the Particular” (45). Instead of seeing God as a “higher synthesis” of the categories of the universal and the particular, Žižek proposes that double kenosis is the proper way in which to apprehend the dialectical nature of God: God is both self-alienated and alienated from humankind, and these two alienations overlap. Žižek asks rhetorically whether “antagonism [is] inscribed into the very heart of God, or is ‘Absolute’ the name for a contradiction tearing apart the very unity of the All?””
[47] Putt, “Religion With/out Religion,” 158; Caputo, The Insistence of God, 80, 272 n. 4; John D. Caputo, After The Death of God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 69.
[48] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 76ff.
[49] John D. Caputo and Catherine Keller, “Theopoetic/Theopolitic,” Crosscurrents, Winter 2007, 109, http://www.crosscurrents.org/Caputo0406.pdf (accessed October 18, 2013).
[50] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 210. Gift in Derrida and Aquinas is a giving that can have no return. As such, receiving Caputo’s “gift” and taking it in a direction he does not intend, such that it does not return to him may actually be the best way to receive his “gift.” Caputo, The Insistence of God, 63. Theopoetics is the discursive shape of radical theology. It uproots the logos of old theology and its propensity toward binaries, in exchange for a poetics.
[51] Caputo and Keller, “Theopoetic/Theopolitic,” 106.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., 107.
[54] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 236ff.
[55] Ibid., 299. Fr. Viens, oui, oui = Come, yes, yes.
[56] Caputo, The Insistence of God, 81.
[57] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 259ff.
[58] This paper has attempted to parallel stylistically Caputo’s own progression of thought and style. To that end I have attempted to modify the style and tone throughout. As such, it is fitting to close with a prayer, more so than a conclusion, as the insistence of the event never concludes. 
[59] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 283.